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Noise Momentum Around the World
We argue that arbitrageurs will strategically limit their initial investment in
an arbitrage opportunity in anticipation of further mispricing caused by the
deepening of noise traders’ misperceptions. Such ‘noise momentum’ is an
important determinant of the overall arbitrage process. We design an
empirical strategy to capture noise momentum in a two-period generalized
error correction model. Applying it to a wide range of international
spot-futures market pairs, we document pervasive evidence of noise
momentum around the world.
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Existing empirical studies of the limits to arbitrage focus on the initial mispricing
error correction coefficient in a one-period framework designed to measure the
level of arbitrage activity. In contrast, the theoretical work of Shleifer and Vishny
(SV, 1997) models the arbitrage process in a multi-period setup. In their paper, over
and above the error correction component, we identify a theoretical concept
(hitherto ignored in the literature) that forms a potentially important part of the
determinants of the arbitrage process. Specifically, in SV’s model, one of the critical
considerations for the arbitrageur in deciding how much effort to apply to correcting
initial mispricing, is the probability of persistence in mispricing. We label this
persistence of the uncorrected pricing errors (after the next period of trading) ‘noise
momentum’. Further, we design an empirical strategy to capture noise momentum
in a two-period generalized error correction model (GECM). We execute an
empirical application to test the importance of noise momentum across global
markets. In so doing, we extend the existing body of knowledge by showing that
noise momentum, together with the initial unarbitraged pricing error, affects price
movements and the path to equilibrium. In short, we document empirical evidence
consistent with the existence of noise momentum around the world.
The uncertainty regarding the level of noise trading and the uncertainty of
other arbitrageurs’ actions poses a nontrivial risk to rational arbitrageurs’ activities
(see, e.g., Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002; Kondor, 2004; Stein, 2009). These models
suggest that knowing the aggregate level of the arbitrage activity present in the
market is important to participants. In contrast to the rich insights offered in existing
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theoretical models on the limits of arbitrage (see Gromb and Vayanos, 2010 for a
survey of the theoretical studies), the short-term dynamics in these models is
under-researched empirically. Our study seeks to redress this situation.
To test our hypotheses, we examine the impact of limited arbitrage and noise
momentum in the index futures market, motivated by the ongoing interest in spot
and futures price dynamics (e.g., Kurov and Lasser, 2004). Derived from the theory
of no-arbitrage, we use a cost of carry framework which predicts that spot and
futures prices are cointegrated. Market equilibrium is achieved by active trading
of arbitrageurs in both markets (e.g., Garbade and Silber, 1983; Stoll and Whaley,
1990). Similar to other equilibrium models, the cause of any disequilibrium and
the path followed to reach an equilibrium state are not explicitly described in theory.
Our modelling approach provides an ideal tool to unlock this ‘black box’.1 Using
daily index futures and spot data from 26 international markets over the maximum
period 1984–2012, we find pervasive evidence of limited arbitrage linked to noise
momentum.
Our core hypothesis concerning the two-period adjustment process is strongly
supported by the empirical analysis. In particular, we document a continuation of
unarbitraged pricing error, that is, that there is ‘noise momentum’ in the price
adjustment. Including the potential for noise momentum as an extra dimension in
the short-term adjustment process enhances our understanding of the price discov-
ery process. Previous empirical literature and the standard one-period arbitrage
models show that the effect of arbitrage is limited when arbitrageurs face various
types of risk, financial constraints, and transaction costs.2 We further demonstrate
that the trading behaviour conditional on the initial level of arbitrage also plays a
significant role in determining the speed of adjustment or the duration of the pricing
errors. In particular, we find that the overall speed of adjustment depends not only
on the initial error correction coefficient but also on the noise momentum coefficient
which captures the market response to the prior period’s unarbitraged error.
Overall, our results highlight the importance of taking into consideration partial
correction when modelling the short-term dynamics of the price–fundamentals
relationship.
Our study contributes to the literature in three fundamental ways. First, we revisit
SV’s analysis and demonstrate the importance of a two-period model for
investigating the full effects arbitrage behaviour. Specifically, the concept of noise
momentum delivers an extra, rich dimension to understanding the price discovery
process. It is an important determinant of the overall mispricing duration. Second,
our empirical application illustrates that the generalized error correction model
we develop for the purpose provides a powerful tool for analyzing the dynamics
1 While the long-run spot and futures price relationship is governed by the cost of carry theory, in the
short run, price synchronization is less than perfect due to the uncertainty in inputs (i.e., interest rates
and dividend yields) to the cost of carry model. The heterogeneity in futures market pricing is mainly
driven by the difference in market participants’ expectations with respect to these input variables.
2 Indeed, previous literature predominantly argues that transaction costs cause the slow adjustment to a
small mispricing (e.g., Sercu et al., 1995; Panos et al., 1997; Roll et al., 2007; Oehmke, 2009).
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of the price–fundamentals relationship. Finally, our empirical study makes a direct
contribution to the spot-futures literature by documenting new insights into the
price dynamics evident between these two markets.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The limits of arbitrage and its consequences in financial markets have been
highlighted in prior empirical analysis and incorporated in a growing body of
theoretical work (see, e.g., DeLong et al., 1990a, b; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Abreu
and Brunnermeier, 2002, 2003; Liu and Longstaff, 2004; Kondor, 2004, 2009; Stein,
2009; Hombert and Thesmar, 2009; Oehmke, 2009; Moreira, 2012; Makarov and
Plantiny, 2012; Buraschi et al., 2014; Ljungqvist and Qian, 2014; Edmans et al.,
2014; see also Gromb and Vayanos, 2010 for an excellent survey). These theoretical
studies provide important and useful models regarding the equilibrium price–
fundamentals relationship and the dynamic interactions between rational and,
sometimes, ‘behaviourally biased’ agents. However, in general the models are char-
acterized as a one-step correction to equilibrium and arbitrageurs are either unable
to learn about market-wide arbitrage capacity or the poor timing of this knowledge
renders it a useless input into their decision making.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), however, study the impact of equity constraints on the
limits of arbitrage in a fully dynamic two-period setting (with three dates/times:
‘time 1’, ‘time 2, and ‘time 3’). In a nutshell, SV’s model suggests two alternative
paths to market equilibrium—the two scenarios depend on whether arbitrageurs
engage in a fully invested or partially invested strategy. A critical determinant of
the investment strategy and the associated price adjustment path is the probability
(denoted by ‘q’) that noise traders’ misperceptions deepen at time 2. We refer to
the deepening of noise traders’ misperceptions as ‘noise momentum’. In the SV
model there is another key parameter, a threshold point for q, denoted q*. When
q < q*, that is, when the probability that noise traders’ misperceptions deepen is
relatively low, arbitrageurs will be more likely to fully invest at time 1. Alternatively,
when q > q* (i.e., the probability of deepening misperceptions is ‘critically’ high),
arbitrageurs will defer some of their investment, expecting that the time 2 price
(p2) will be further away from fundamentals.
Arbitrageurs care about the deepening of time 2 mispricing because their funding
is constrained by their initial arbitrage performance. SV describe this structure as
performance-based arbitrage (PBA). Essentially, investors in the arbitrage fund
would withdraw/augment funds conditional on the performance of the fund between
time 1 and time 2. Alternatively, this structure can be interpreted as the funding
allocation strategy of a large arbitrage fund among its different fund managers. Such
a PBA approach can also be applied to an arbitrage fund in which leverage is used,
thus magnifying the predicted effects, and in this case changes in the market price
affect margin requirements. When mispricing deepens, the arbitrageurs’ initial
investment would require higher margins and, therefore, they would have to liqui-
date part of their holdings and realize losses to generate sufficient cash to meet
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the margin calls. The overall effect predicted by this model is a reduction of
arbitrage-focused funds in the market. On the other hand, if market conditions
improve by time 2, leveraged arbitrageurs can release some funds from their
margins and reinvest further into the market.
The SV model focuses on analyzing the effect of funding constraints on the overall
efficiency of the price. A key focus of our enhancement to the SV model is to
analyze the realized mispricing correction/persistence in time 1 and time 2. In so
doing, we are able to characterize the arbitrageurs’ impact on the subsequent price
movements and the duration of pricing errors.
To lay the foundations of our analysis, we define a range of basic concepts
(and associated symbolic representations) which, as much as possible, accord with
the SV model setup. Let V be the fundamental value of the asset at time 3, which
is known to the arbitrageurs but not to the fund investors or noise traders. S1 and
S2 are the noise traders’ shocks at time 1 and 2, respectively, that is, these ‘shocks’
represent the extent to which noise traders in aggregate undervalue the asset
relative to its fundamental value V (a larger S indicates a greater undervaluation
‘shock’). F1 and F2 are cumulative resources under management by arbitrageurs at
times 1 and 2, respectively. SV assume that F1 is exogenous, while F2 is determined
endogenously within the model. D1 is the amount that arbitrageurs invest in the
asset at time 1. Parameter a captures the sensitivity of arbitrage funds under
management at time 2 (i.e., F2) to its initial performance, suggesting that these
investors would withdraw or increase funds according to performance-based
arbitrage.3 Noise trader demand for the asset is given by: QN(t) = (VSt)/pt.
Arbitrageurs’ demand for the asset at time 1 is given by: QA(1)=D1/p1. When the
market is cleared, QN(1) +QA(1)= 1 and we have the price at time 1 given by
p1 =VS1 +D1, while p2 =VS2 +F2 is derived similarly.
Now define the pricing error correction activity by the ratio Κ=D1/S1, a metric
designed to capture the proportion of mispricing correction achieved by
arbitrageurs at time 1. At one extreme,Κ=0 implies that there is no error correction
by arbitrageurs. At the other extreme, Κ=1 indicates that full error correction
occurs.4 Our initial hypothesis (H1) relates to the basic action of correcting (at least
partially) initial mispricing:
3 SV specify the supply of time 2 funding to arbitrageurs as follows:
F2 ¼ F1 þ aD1 p2p1
 1
 
;with a≥1:
The arbitrageurs’ funding is determined by the performance of their investment between time 1 and time
2. Notice that when a = 1, investors play no role in affecting their available funding. Alternatively, a can be
regarded as a parameter reflecting the degree to which an arbitrageur chooses to increase or decrease
capital investment in an arbitrage strategy.
4 In SV’s analysis, it is assumed that arbitrage resources are not sufficient to bring prices all the way to
fundamentalvalues, i.e., F1 ≤ S1 . This implies that D1 ≤ F1< S1.
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H1: Initial Mispricing Correction
Arbitrageurs engage in initial mispricing correction (i.e., Κ>0) and the limited ar-
bitrage version of this hypothesis is captured by Κ<1.
After time 1 trading is complete, the quantity, Vp1, measures the pricing error
which has not been arbitraged away, where p1 is the price determined by the supply
and demand at time 1. This pricing error is observed before the next round of
trading. The quantity, Vp2, measures the pricing error that remains after time 2
trading. Now we introduce a new parameter,Λ ¼ Vp2Vp1 ¼
Vp2
S1D1, capturing the degree
of error persistence or noise momentum after time 2 trading.5 At one extreme, when
V=p2 such that none of the error persists, we have Λ = 0. Conversely, if all of the
time 1 pricing error persists, then p2 =p1 and, thus, there is 100% error persistence,
that is, Λ = 1. It is also possible that the pricing error might even become exacer-
bated in time 2, such that p2<p1, in which case Λ > 1.
Our setup shows an important insight in terms of overall arbitrage activity. All
existing empirical models are based on the one-period error correction model in
which the speed of mispricing correction or arbitrage adjustment is determined
solely byΚ. In our extended analysis of the SV model, Λ is an additional key param-
eter that jointly withΚ dictates the speed of overall arbitrage adjustment in our two-
period setting. Hence, the standard one-period error correction model is valid only
if Λ is equal to zero, which occurs when noise momentum is absent, such that p2 =V.
We therefore have our core testable hypothesis.
H2: Noise Momentum
Noise momentum affects arbitrageurs’ behaviour regarding the mechanism for
correcting mispricing (i.e., Λ > 0).
Our extension of the SV model argues that the (initial) mispricing correction
parameter, Κ, and the noise momentum (or mispricing persistence) parameter after
time 2 trading, Λ, are both important in characterizing the overall speed of the
arbitrage adjustment process or the duration of pricing errors. The noise momentum
coefficient is zero only if noise traders’ misperceptions are corrected completely in
the second period.
A GENERALIZED ERROR CORRECTION MODELWITH NOISE
MOMENTUM
Basic One-period ECM Setup Accommodating Mispricing Correction
To begin the empirical side of our analysis, we set up a basic one-period error
correction modelling (ECM) framework, consistent with the majority of the
5 Note that p1 =V S1 +D1. A simple re-arrangement produces: V p1 = S1D1, and, thus, demon-
strates equivalence of the denominators in the two alternative definitions of the noise momentum
parameter defined in the text.
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developments in the extant literature. Consider the long-run price–fundamentals
relationship given by:6
f t ¼ f t þ zt (1)
where ft is the observed market price, f

t is the fundamental value of the asset, and zt
is the short-term deviation of observed price from its fundamental value. Notice that
f t is the martingale difference sequence such that zt is stationary but serially corre-
lated. For simplicity we represent zt as an AR process:
zt ¼ ϕzt1 þ εt; εteiid 0; σ2ε  (2)
where εt is regarded as the mispricing innovations. Taking the first difference of (1),
and using Δzt= κzt 1 + εt, with κ = ϕ – 1, we obtain the standard ECM:
Δf t ¼ Δf t þ κzt1 þ εt (3)
The parameter, κ, measures the impact of arbitrage trading activity in
correcting the pricing error towards the long-run equilibrium relationship, and
lies between –1 and 0. Next, we suppose that the reduced-form data-generating
process for f t is given by:
Δf t ¼ πΔf t1 þ et; eteiid 0; σ2e  (4)
which allows for the (possible) feedback trading pattern, where positive (negative) π
implies positive (negative) feedback trading, and et captures the innovations from
the fundamental value of the asset,7 after controlling for feedback trading.8 This
setup is motivated by both empirical and theoretical evidence that market price
might potentially induce fundamental changes. It has been documented that the
futures market can influence pricing of the underlying index (see, e.g., Chan, 1992).
One important issue is whether or not the pricing error innovation (εt) and the
innovation of fundamentals (et) are independent of each other. If they are not
correlated, then the pricing error innovation is random noise. If the pricing errors
are linked to fundamental news, then these two error innovations will be correlated.
6 Without loss of generality we assume that the equilibrium coefficient on the fundamentals is unity.
7 Consider as an example the cost of carry model, which we investigate later in the empirical section. In
this case et captures the innovations related to fundamental changes in the valuation of the stocks, the
discount rate, and the dividend yield. If these three inputs change, then the fundamental values also
change, making the futures price react accordingly.
8 This is the simplest specification allowing for feedback trading. Following Hasbrouck (1991), we can
readily extend equation (4) by adding the higher lagged terms of Δfti and Δft  i.
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If their contemporaneous correlation is significantly different from zero, Δf t is
weakly endogenous with respect to εt in equation (3). To deal with this issue, we
consider the following regression:
εt ¼ ωet þ ut ¼ ω Δf t  πΔf t1
 þ ut; uteiid 0; σ2u  (5)
where ut is uncorrelated with et by construction. Then, replacing εt in equation (3)
with equation (5) and rearranging, we obtain the more efficient ECM as follows:
Δf t ¼ κzt1 þ γΔf t1 þ δΔf t þ ut (6)
where γ= ωπ and δ=1+ω. Notice that model (6) accommodates the dynamics
of price overreaction or underreaction with respect to fundamental changes
through the contemporaneous reaction coefficient, δ, as well as the short-run mo-
mentum effects through the coefficient, γ. Only if the market is efficient (i.e., εt is
iid, in which case ω=0 trivially), then we expect that a one-unit (permanent)
change in fundamentals should cause a one-unit change in the market price,
instantaneously.
Two-period GECM Accommodating Mispricing Correction and Noise Momentum
The model developed so far, called the standard (one-period) ECM, is a natural
starting point for an analysis of hypotheses relating to the limits of arbitrage.
However, the ECM suffers from a fundamental weakness as only limited dynam-
ics are covered; namely, the speed of adjustment (or the ‘reciprocal’ concept,
duration of mispricing) in equation (6) is measured solely by the error correction
coefficient, κ.
SV’s model suggests that extending the analysis of arbitrage into a two-period
model is important. Recall, we label the continuation of unarbitraged errors the
‘noise momentum’ effect, and measure it by the further pricing impacts of initial
unarbitraged pricing error components. We can accommodate this important new
dimension most simply by supposing that the pricing errors, zt, follow an AR(2) pro-
cess of the form:
zt ¼ ϕzt1 þ λ ϕzt2ð Þ þ εt; εteiid 0; σ2ε  (7)
where ϕzt 2 = (1+ κ)zt 2 is the unarbitraged error carried over from the previous
period and the parameter, λ, measures the further pricing impact of these (initial)
unarbitraged pricing error components, that is, ‘noise momentum’ effects. The
higher is λ, the higher the noise momentum in the price.
Combining equations (1), (4), (5), and (7), we finally obtain the two-period
GECM given by:
Δf t ¼ κzt1 þ λ 1þ κð Þzt2f g þ δΔf t þ γΔf t1 þ ut; uteiid 0; σ2u  (8)
The GECM simultaneously captures the (complex) dynamics of the two-period
interaction between arbitrageurs and noise traders. The distinguishing feature of
the GECM is that we can accommodate ‘noise momentum’ effects through the
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term λ{(1 + κ)zt 2}, with the parameter λ measuring the strength of noise momen-
tum and (1+ κ)zt 2 representing the unarbitraged component of the pricing errors
from the previous period. It is easily seen that the standard one-period GECM
will be biased in the case where the λ coefficient is non-zero (i.e., H2).
We can transform the GECM, equation (8), into the following autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL) specification:
f t ¼ ϕ1f t1 þ ϕ2f t2 þ γ0f t þ γ1f t1 þ γ2f t2 þ ut (9)
where ϕ1 = (1+ κ+ γ) , ϕ2 = λ(1+ κ) γ , γ0 = δ, γ1 =  (δ+ κ), and γ2 =  λ(1+ κ). The
overall speed of convergence to equilibrium is now determined jointly by parame-
ters κ and λ; namely, it is captured by ϕ1 +ϕ2 1= κ+ λ(1+ κ). Since 1< κ<0, a
positive noise momentum would make the pricing errors more persistent. Notably,
this is a dynamic issue (of potential importance) which cannot be addressed by the
conventional one-period model.
Decomposition of the Pricing Errors
The GECM incorporates several important economic concepts which are most
clearly identified and understood by decomposing the pricing error. Specifically, the
pricing error, zt, from the two-period GECM in equation (8), can be represented as:
zt ¼ 1þ κð Þzt1 þ λ 1þ κð Þzt2f g þ ωΔf t þ γΔf t1 þ ut; uteiid 0; σ2u  (10)
where Δf t captures the innovations from the fundamental value of the asset.
Equation (10) presents a five-part decomposition of the pricing error, which is
discussed below.
The first and second components provide a natural framework for testing our hy-
potheses regarding the limits to arbitrage and its impact on further price dynamics
through the two parameters, κ and λ.9 As discussed earlier, arbitrage is limited,
9 The parameter K (defined earlier as ‘pricing error correction’) and parameter κ are closely allied,
and both relate to the level of initial error correction in the theoretical and empirical models,
respectively. Specifically, κ = Κ or |κ| =Κ, that is, conceptually, in absolute value they are identical.
In the theoretical model, we conceptualize the degree of error correction as a positive quantity. In
contrast, in the empirical model, given the basic structure of the specification in equation (10)
(i.e., zt = f(zt-1, zt-2, …)), the error correction parameter κ should be negative if the short-run price
dynamics are indeed error correcting, because this parameter is devised to measure the extent to
which the impact of the past error reduces relative to today’s error. At one extreme, κ = 0 (=K) which
reflects no error correction by arbitrageurs at time 1, while at the other extreme κ =  1 (K = 1)
thereby capturing the case in which there is 100% reduction in the impact of the past error, that is,
the full error-correction case. An intermediate scenario would be κ =  0.5 (K = 0.5), that is, ϕ = 0.5,
which captures the case of a 50% reduction in the impact of the past error. As such, in our empirical
discussion, we refer to the ‘magnitude of κ ’ to draw appropriate comparisons with its theoretical
counterpart, Κ. Furthermore, the definition of λ and its theoretical counterpart Λ, are perfectly
matched. Both measure the same concept of noise momentum, that is, the percentage of uncorrected
error from time 1, which persists after the next period of trading.
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suggesting that |κ| is below unity. In the context of this setup, H1 now becomes:
0 < |κ| < 1. Hence, the unarbitraged pricing error component persists into the next
trading period and the extent of such persistence is captured by the parameter λ.
The third component measures the degree of the over- or under-reaction
with respect to the contemporaneous fundamental changes. Generally, ω is
likely to be non-zero unless the market is perfectly efficient. The sign of ω
determines the direction of the price reaction to fundamental impact. If ω is
positive (i.e., the pricing error innovation εt is positively correlated with the
fundamental valuation innovation et), then the futures price overreacts to the
fundamentals’ shock, irrespective of the sign of the innovation. On the other
hand, a negative ω implies that the futures price underreacts to the fundamen-
tals’ shock. The fourth term represents the short-run momentum effect. The
sign of γ (γ= ωπ ) is generally ambiguous since it depends on the product
of the correlation coefficient, ω, and the feedback trading coefficient, π. As
such this is an empirical issue.
The last component, ut, is an idiosyncratic error term with zero mean and finite
variance, σ2u . Notice that the total variance of the mispricing innovation, εt, is
obtained simply as the sum of the variance of fundamental innovation, et, and the
variance of idiosyncratic error, ut.
Finally, in the context of equation (10) we see that the magnitude and amplitude
of the initial pricing errors are determined mainly by parameters ω, γ, and σ2u, while
the overall speed of convergence to equilibrium (as already outlined above) is
determined jointly by k and λ, namely (k+ λ(1+ κ)). Importantly, positive noise
momentum would make the pricing errors more persistent.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO INDEX FUTURES
Empirical Model
The cost of carry model is based on the exclusion of arbitrage and assumes that the
risk-free rate and dividend yield are given. Specifically, we expect the following
relationship to hold in equilibrium:
Ft;T ¼ St exp rt  qtð Þτt½  (11)
whereFt;T is the ‘fair value’ of a futures contract maturing at time T; St is the current
value of the spot index; rt is the risk-free interest rate, τt= (T t), and qt is the divi-
dend yield on the index.
Assuming that the risk-free rate and dividend yield are deterministic, Ft;T and St
will share the same stochastic trend. The futures and spot prices are cointegrated
under general conditions (Ghosh, 1993; Wahab and Lashgari, 1993; Brenner and
Kroner, 1995). Significant deviations from the prediction of cost of carry can reflect
violations of the model’s assumptions.
The key assumption underlying the cost of carry model is that market partici-
pants take advantage of arbitrage opportunities as soon as they occur (Hull,
NOISE MOMENTUM AROUND THE WORLD
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2008).10 However, empirically, only partial adjustment is found (e.g., Stoll and
Whaley, 1986; MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988). The ECM and GECM devel-
oped above provide an ideal tool for helping us to understand the rich dynamics be-
hind the pricing error generated and the associated convergence processes. Their
empirical counterparts, respectively, are given by:
Δf t ¼ αþ κz^t1 þ 1þ ωð ÞΔf t þ ωπð ÞΔf t1 þ ut (12)
Δf t ¼ αþ κz^t1 þ λ 1þ κð Þz^t2 þ 1þ ωð ÞΔf t þ ωπð ÞΔf t1 þ ut (13)
where ft is the natural log of the futures contract price; f

t is the natural log of the
fundamental value implied by the cost of carry model, f t ¼ st þ rt  qtð Þτt ; st is the
natural log of the spot index price; rt is the risk-free rate; and qt is the dividend yield
on the index. The pricing error, z^t, is estimated from the long-run equation:
f t ¼ μþ θf t þ zt (14)
Comparing equation (14) with equation (1), we allow for both an intercept and a
non-unity long-run coefficient for general purposes. According to the cost of carry
model, the theoretical value of θ equals 1.
Data
We collect spot and futures data from 26 international markets to illustrate the
existence of noise momentum around the world. We use differential time periods
covering the complete lifespan of the daily index spot and futures contracts between
January 1982 (earliest available) and December 2013. The markets covered are:
(a) North America—Canada and the US (four alternatives); (b) Asia-Pacific
—Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand;
(c) Europe—Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK.11
These markets are summarized in Appendix A, Table A1. Proxies for the risk-free
interest rate are shown in Table A2. Divided yields on the indices are also collected.
10 In prior studies, transaction costs and market liquidity have been proposed to explain the temporary
deviation from the cost of carry model. Generally, it is documented that liquidity enhances the effi-
ciency of the futures-cash pricing system (e.g., Stoll and Whaley, 1986; MacKinlay and Ramaswamy,
1988; Roll et al., 2007). Temporary deviations from cost of carry also motivate several studies to em-
ploy threshold error correction models (e.g., Yadav et al., 1994; Martens et al., 1995).
11 The power of our empirical tests is potentially weakened by the lower liquidity evident in some of the
individual markets included. While we clearly have a wide variation of liquidity across our sample, in
unreported analysis, we find evidence of reasonable activity even in the emerging/developing market
sub-sample. Given that an illiquidity effect would tend to induce noise and make it harder to find the
predicted relationships, the fact that our results are uniformly strong allays any major concerns
around our research design in this regard.
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The main data are sourced from DataStream and where the dividend yields and in-
terest rate data are missing we supplement with data from Bloomberg. A continuous
series of the nearest term futures contracts is constructed by DataStream. The series
switch to the next nearest contract on the first day of the expiry month for the
nearest term contract. We use a full set of expiry dates for all the contracts to ensure
correct matching of the date to maturity in the continued futures price series.
Table 1 reports the sample averages for all variables (measured in percentage
terms), across the different markets in our full sample.
As expected, the movements of the paired spot and futures prices closely mimic
each other. For each market, the average price changes are of the same magnitude
while the volatilities are higher in the futures contracts. For example, in the case of
the US S&P 500 (ISP), the average daily basis (the log difference between futures
and spot prices) is 0.36%. After applying the cost of carry model, the difference
between the futures price and the fair estimate (f f*) is, on average, zero.12 Similar
findings are documented in other country pairs. The mean pricing error is zero,
suggesting that on average the markets are in equilibrium.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Initial Mispricing Correction around the World: One-period ECM Results
The detailed market-by-market estimation results for the one-period ECM in
equation (12) are reported in Table 2, with an accompanying summary provided in
Table 3. Our main focus in this baseline estimation is the role of the kappa param-
eter, reflecting the initial mispricing correction. At a general level, we observe that
in all 29 cases the estimated coefficient is negative and significant (at the 1% level).
Accordingly, there is pervasive evidence supporting the role of initial mispricing
correction in futures-spot markets, in line with H1. That is, our analysis in the
context of this simple ECM framework supports the view that arbitrageurs engage
in initial mispricing correction (i.e., |κ| > 0). Moreover, we see the magnitude of
kappa estimates range in the (0,1) interval, thereby indicating that this initial
correction phenomenon is consistent with limited arbitrage (i.e., |κ| < 1).
Figure 1 plots the initial error correction parameters from highest to lowest
(in magnitude) across our sample of markets. We see that the maximum (minimum)
magnitude of this effect occurs in Canada (Italy). Other large magnitude cases are
evident for the US (except CJD), Japan, and Germany. These results suggest that
a stronger role for initial mispricing correction is more likely to occur in the larger,
more prominent markets. However, the patterns are quite mixed. While the devel-
oping markets of China, Malaysia, and Poland exhibit small magnitude estimates,
relatively close to zero, so too do the much bigger developed markets of France
and the UK. Thus, while we do observe considerable variation across market
12 As expected, the point estimate of long-run coefficient θ across all markets is very close to (and
statistically indistinguishable from) unity. While full details of these analyses are suppressed here
to conserve space, they are available from the authors upon request.
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE MEANS FOR BASE VARIABLES ACROSS MARKETS
Panel A: North America
Country CN US
Futures CDD CJD CJI CRI IS
Δf 4.14 3.66 4.08 7.21 8.32
Δs 4.05 3.51 4.00 7.20 8.26
f –s 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.044 0.36
f –f* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
r 2.47 2.41 2.34 3.79 4.25
q 2.00 2.24 2.24 1.19 2.50
N 3710 4096 4211 4007 8242
Panel B: Asia-Pacific
Country AU CH HK JP KO MY TA TH
Futures AAP CIF HSI JSX KKX KLC TTX TST
Δf 3.79 7.44 8.95 2.00 5.03 3.19 0.40 7.14
Δs 3.81 7.56 8.86 2.01 5.00 3.16 0.47 7.08
f –s 0.09 0.38 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.06 0.29 0.50
f –f* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
r 5.07 2.75 4.39 1.48 5.85 4.20 2.28 3.03
q 3.99 1.57 3.30 0.78 2.53 0.66 2.99 3.87
N 3539 942 7190 6581 4582 4682 4005 1977
Panel C: Europe
Country BD BG ES FR GR HN IT NL
Futures GDX BFX MBX FCX ASI BUX MSM ETI
Δf 7.52 0.19 5.70 0.45 13.34 13.00 3.57 4.79
Δs 7.48 0.27 5.64 0.41 13.21 12.73 3.27 4.77
f –s 0.52 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.49 1.11 0.35 0.01
f –f* 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
r 3.50 2.84 4.54 2.41 2.33 10.02 1.87 3.93
q 1.98 3.33 3.51 3.36 3.17 1.63 1.85 3.47
N 5846 4601 5636 3882 3716 4755 2526 6544
Country OE PO PT RS SD SW TK UK
Futures VTX WIG PSX RTS OMF ZMI TRF LSX
Δf 1.24 3.60 6.14 6.25 5.89 7.36 9.88 5.78
Δs 0.18 3.85 5.98 6.20 5.86 7.31 11.72 5.80
f –s 0.29 0.21 0.23 0.51 0.14 0.08 0.27 0.35
f –f* 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
r 2.59 8.08 2.63 4.38 1.72 2.27 11.76 7.10
q 2.40 2.44 3.59 1.13 2.77 1.95 2.47 3.44
N 3730 4137 3705 2169 2290 6012 1846 7713
This table reports the sample mean for all of the variables employed across each market. Table 6 in Ap-
pendix A provides the full list of the markets covered. The variables included are: Δs (Δf) is the first dif-
ference of log spot (futures) price; f t;T ¼ st þ rt  qtð Þτt where st = ln (St), rt is the annualized risk-free
interest rate on an investment for the period τt = T-t; qt is the annualized dividend yield on the index,
while N is the sample size for each market. All numbers are tabulated in percentage point terms.
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TABLE 2
ONE-PERIOD ECM ESTIMATION RESULTS—INITIAL MISPRICING CORRECTION
AROUND THE WORLD
Panel A: North America
Coeff. CN US
CDD CJD CJI CRI ISP
α 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
κ 0.714*** 0.039*** 0.617*** 0.558*** 0.394***
ω 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.002 0.044*** 0.045***
π 0.370*** 0.923*** 4.318 0.608*** 0.015
N 3705 4091 4206 4002 8237
Panel B: Asia-Pacific
Coeff. AU CH 1HK JP KO MY 2TA TH
AAP CIF HSI JSX KKX KLC TTX TST
α 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
κ 0.301*** 0.151*** 0.268*** 0.512*** 0.162*** 0.102*** 0.180*** 0.235***
ω 0.038*** 0.054*** 0.028*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.125*** 0.077*** 0.049***
π 0.085 0.395** 1.077*** 1.006*** 1.932*** 0.984*** 0.992*** 0.998***
N 3534 937 7185 6576 4577 4677 4000 1972
Panel C: Europe
Coeff. BD BG ES FR GR HN IT NL
GDX BFX MBX FCX ASI BUX MSM ETI
α 0.001 0.005 0.017 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.001 0.000
κ 0.435*** 0.186*** 0.132*** 0.071*** 0.222*** 0.281*** 0.037*** 0.123***
ω 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.727*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.139*** 0.035*** 0.008***
π 0.435*** 0.423** 0.002 0.057 1.059*** 0.330*** 0.808*** 0.616*
N 5841 4464 5631 3877 3711 4750 2521 6539
Coeff. OE PO PT RS SD SW TK UK
VTX WIG PSX RTS OMF ZMI TRF LSX
α 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.039 0.001
κ 0.148*** 0.051*** 0.082*** 0.228*** 0.094*** 0.137*** 0.193*** 0.098***
ω 0.010* 0.059*** 0.006 0.076*** 0.012*** 0.007** 0.537*** 0.009***
π 0.679 0.722*** 3.584 0.959*** 3.891** 3.249** 0.162*** 3.062***
N 3628 4132 3606 2164 2285 6007 1841 7708
This table reports the estimation results for the one-period ECM for pairs of futures contracts and country
stock indices, around the world, as listed in Table 6 in Appendix A. The ECM is specified as follows
(equation (12)): Δf t ¼ αþ κz^t1 þ 1þ ωð ÞΔf t þ ωπð ÞΔf t1 þ ut ;where Δ is the first difference operator;
{α, κ,ω, π} are the parameters, and ut is the error term. The residual, z^t ; of the long-run model is obtained
from the following estimation: f t ¼ μþ θf t þ zt where ft is the natural log of the actual futures contract
price; f t is the natural log of the fundamental value implied by the cost of carry model, f

t ¼ st þ rt  qtð Þτt;
st is the natural log of the spot index price; rt is the risk-free rate; and qt is the dividend yield on the index.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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settings and we are unable to draw strong conclusions regarding any trends, we do
present pervasive evidence of the predicted initial mispricing correction effect.
Noise Momentum around the World: Two-period GECM Results
The detailed market-by-market estimation results for the two-period GECM in
equation (13) are reported in Table 4, with an accompanying summary provided in
Table 5. In Table 4, various findings are worthy of special focus—primarily, those
linking to our two key hypotheses. We see in the table that the estimated initial
mispricing parameters, κ, are negative and significant in all 29 cases, once more
mimicking the outcome of the one-period ECM. Again, this supports the limits to
arbitrage version of the initial mispricing correction hypothesis (H1).
Based on the range of point estimates produced, the median value (with a
magnitude of approximately 41%) suggests that just under half of the prior period
pricing error is corrected. It is noteworthy that this is a much higher correction than
the counterpart median observed in the one-period ECM—with a value less than
20% in magnitude. Indeed, comparing the initial mispricing correction coefficients
between the ECM and GECM models market-by-market, in most cases it appears
that arbitrageurs play a much bigger role in bringing the price back to its fundamen-
tal value than suggested by the simpler ECM setup. Only in the case of Spain does
the magnitude of the estimate not increase. Such a contrasting result suggests that
the one-period ECM gives a biased and unreliable view of the initial error
correction forces evident in the data. This is most noticeable for the French and
FIGURE 1
INITIAL MISPRICING CORRECTION IMPLIED BY THE ONE-PERIOD ECM
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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TABLE 4
TWO-PERIOD GECM ESTIMATION RESULTS—NOISEMOMENTUMAROUND THEWORLD
Panel A: North America
Coeff. CN US
CDD CJD CJI CRI ISP
α 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
κ 0.761*** 0.188*** 0.705*** 0.652*** 0.540***
λ 0.694*** 0.190*** 0.752*** 0.523*** 0.466***
ω 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.000 0.047*** 0.048***
π 0.199 0.573** 19.672 0.300*** 0.390***
N 3705 4091 4206 4002 8237
Panel B: Asia-Pacific
Coeff. AU CH HK JP KO MY TA TH
AAP CIF HSI JSX KKX KLC TTX TST
α 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
κ 0.518*** 0.365*** 0.410*** 0.629*** 0.349*** 0.325*** 0.365*** 0.462***
λ 0.636*** 0.399*** 0.316*** 0.572*** 0.328*** 0.343*** 0.342*** 0.524***
ω 0.033*** 0.052*** 0.020*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.125*** 0.079*** 0.053***
π 0.467*** 0.492*** 0.103 0.540*** 0.998*** 0.401*** 0.563*** 0.259*
N 3534 937 7185 6576 4577 4677 4000 1972
Panel C: Europe
Coeff. BD BG ES FR GR HN IT NL
GDX BFX MBX FCX ASI BUX MSM ETI
α 0.001 0.004 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.000
κ 0.599*** 0.462*** 0.101*** 0.324*** 0.474*** 0.454*** 0.197*** 0.404***
λ 0.725*** 0.610*** 0.088*** 0.404*** 0.602*** 0.436*** 0.206*** 0.536***
ω 0.016*** 0.032*** 0.707*** 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.138*** 0.034*** 0.008***
π 0.115 0.363** 0.001 0.204* 0.357 0.004 0.858*** 0.514
N 5841 4464 5631 3877 3711 4750 2521 6539
Coeff. OE PO PT RS SD SW TK UK
VTX WIG PSX RTS OMF ZMI TRF LSX
α 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.033 0.000
κ 0.450*** 0.188*** 0.364*** 0.415*** 0.357*** 0.447*** 0.431*** 0.349***
λ 0.636*** 0.178*** 0.475*** 0.395*** 0.450*** 0.648*** 0.494*** 0.423***
ω 0.009 0.055*** 0.005 0.082*** 0.015*** 0.006** 0.547*** 0.014***
π 3.207 0.563*** -2.982 0.435*** 1.862*** 1.613** 0.171*** 0.555**
N 3628 4132 3606 2164 2285 6007 1841 7708
This table reports the estimation results of the two-period GECM for pairs of futures contracts and coun-
try stock indices, around the world, as listed in Table 6 in Appendix A. The GECM is specified as follows
(equation (13)):Δf t ¼ αþ κz^t1 þ λ 1þ κð Þz^t2 þ 1þ ωð ÞΔf t þ ωπð ÞΔf t1 þ ut where Δ is the first differ-
ence operator; {α, κ, λ,ω, π} are the parameters, and ut is the error term. The residual, z^t; of the long-run
model is obtained from the following estimation: f t ¼ μþ θf t þ zt where ft is the natural log of the actual
futures contract price; f t is the natural log of the fundamental value implied by the cost of carry model,
f t ¼ st þ rt  qtð Þτt; st is the natural log of the spot index price; rt is the risk-free rate; and qt is the dividend
yield on the index. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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UK markets—while both of these in the ECM analysis showed statistically signifi-
cant correction effects, neither seemed to differ markedly from zero in economic
terms. Now both France and the UK show coefficient estimates exceeding 30%,
which is much more economically meaningful.
Our primary focus is on the estimated noise momentum coefficient (λ), which
links to the ‘noise momentum’ hypothesis, H2. Notably, in Tables 4 and 5 we find
that the effect of noise momentum is positive and significant in all but one case
(the one exception is Spain). This finding provides strong support for our noise
momentum hypothesis which highlights that, over and above any correction for ini-
tial mispricing in the first period, the convergence to equilibrium displays a degree
of momentum in the mispricing or ‘noise’ component. It is noteworthy that all the
estimated positive coefficients are less than unity.
Looking at the country-by-country results, we see the overall maximum case of
noise momentum occurs in the US market (CJI) with a value of 0.752, closely
shadowed by Canada (0.694). In the Asia-Pacific region, Australia (0.637) and
Japan (0.572) produce the highest values, while in Europe, Germany (0.725) and
Sweden (0.649) are prominent. At the other end of the spectrum, aside from
Spain, which exhibits the only negative noise momentum coefficient, we have Italy
(0.206) and Poland (0.178) standing out with the lowest values. Nevertheless, no
strong patterns emerge, for example, in terms of a developed versus emerging
market divide. For a visual appreciation, Figure 2 plots the Kappa and Lambda
parameters produced by the GECM across our sample of markets.
For completeness, we make some closing general observations regarding the
remaining estimated parameters of the two-period model. First, regarding the inter-
cept we see that in all cases it is insignificant. While not a guarantee, it is suggestive
that the specification is one not greatly challenged by mis-specification. In other
words, the empirical specification is closely matched with the theoretical model in
which this parameter is expected to be zero.
Second, regarding the parameter ω, we observe only three instances of insignifi-
cance—we have 16 (10) significant negative (positive) cases, at the 10% level or bet-
ter. Recall that in the context of equation (10), which decomposes the pricing errors
into its various parts, the ω coefficient relates to the component that measures the
degree of the over- or underreaction with respect to the contemporaneous funda-
mental changes. Our findings suggest that the futures price is more likely to under-
react than overreact on the fundamentals shocks from the underlying stock index.
Finally, regarding parameter π, there is a preponderance of (few) significant cases with
a positive (negative) sign, namely, 15 (four) cases at the 10% level. Recall that in the
context of equation (4), this coefficient relates to the short-run momentum effect.
Specifically, a positive (negative) π implies positive (negative) feedback trading. Ac-
cordingly, this GECM analysis suggests a high incidence of positive feedback trading.
Speed of Mispricing Correction and Duration of Error Convergence
As indicated earlier, measuring the speed of mispricing correction is a point of
contrast between our two models: in the one-period ECM it is given by κ, whereas
in the two-period GECM it is a function of both initial mispricing correction, κ,
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and noise momentum, λ, namely, κ + λ(1 + κ). To illustrate, we can isolate a few in-
teresting examples. In the case of the US (CRI) the ECM provides a value of –0.559,
whereas the GECM provides an overall speed of –0.470 (=–0.652 + 0.524(0.348)).
Hence, by ignoring the noise momentum component, the ECM overstates the speed
of mispricing correction by nine percentage points (i.e., 55.9% vs. 47%). As another
example, consider Japan. In this case, the ECM provides a value of –0.512, whereas
the GECM provides an overall speed of –0.417 (=–0.629 + 0.572(0.371)). Hence, by
FIGURE 2
INITIAL MISPRICING CORRECTION AND NOISE MOMENTUM IMPLIED BY THE TWO-
PERIOD GECM
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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ignoring the noise momentum component, the ECM overstates the speed of
mispricing correction by close to 10 percentage points (i.e., 51% vs. 41%). As a final
example, consider Italy. In this case, the ECM provides a value of –0.037, whereas
the GECM provides an overall speed of –0.0316 (=–0.197 + 0.206(0.803)).
An associated question of interest is how long does it take the price change to con-
verge to its long-run value, implied by either of our models? In other words, what is
the ‘duration’ (in days) of the mispricing error convergence? The answer to this
question is quite simply evaluated by taking the reciprocal of the (overall) adjust-
ment coefficient. To this end, Figure 3 provides a comparative plot of the error du-
ration implied by the ECM versus GECM models.
Generally, it is true that we see somewhat similar values in several cases, but this
belies the relative role of the underlying components (i.e., Kappa versus Lambda),
as discussed above. Consider a few interesting examples. At the short end of the spec-
trum, across our sample markets, the US (CRI) exhibits durations of 1.8 days versus
2.1 days for the ECM versus GECMmodels. In contrast, for the longest durations we
see Italy with values of 27 days versus 31.6 days for the ECM versus GECM models.
Thus, regarding the question of the duration of error convergence, while it seems to
matter little for the US, the choice of modelling ECM versus GECM does make an
appreciable difference for a market like Italy. Nevertheless, in percentage terms we
generally see a nontrivial difference between the alternative paired duration esti-
mates—in the order of 15% (measured relative to the ECM benchmark).
FIGURE 3
DURATION OF MISPRICING IN ECM AND GECM MODELS
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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CONCLUSION
Building on Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) theoretical work, we study the dynamics of
limited arbitrage. Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) model shows an important insight
into why arbitrageurs might deliberately limit their initial arbitrage, given their con-
cern about further mispricing in the next period. We show that second-period error
persistence (labelled ‘noise momentum’) is an important parameter in characteriz-
ing the overall speed of the adjustment process, augmenting the initial error correc-
tion coefficient as commonly used in the standard one-period ECM.
To test our model predictions, we develop a two-period error correction model.
We apply our model to study the dynamics of limited arbitrage in the index futures
market, an important area of ongoing research interest in its own right. Using paired
daily index futures and spot data from 26 international markets over the maximum
period 1984–2012, in addition to initial mispricing error we document pervasive
evidence of limited arbitrage linked to noise momentum around the world.
Notably, the significance of this noise momentum coefficient suggests a serious
misspecification in the standard error correction models used in the literature.
Our empirical application illustrates that the generalized error correction model
we develop for the purpose provides a powerful tool for analyzing the dynamics
of the price–fundamentals relationship. The potential applications of this approach
go well beyond that developed in the current paper. For example, our approach
can be applied to explore the short-term dynamics associated with fundamental
long-run cointegrating relationships (e.g., the price–dividend relationship) and the
pricing dynamics between segmented markets for single assets (e.g., cross-listing
and commodity contracts in different markets). We commend these and other mean-
ingful applications to future research agendas.
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